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CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT 
 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1, the 
undersigned states that none of the amici are corporations that issue 
stock or have a parent corporation that issues stock. 
Dated: November 7, 2019   By: /s/ Venkat Balasubramani  




STATEMENT OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 29 
 This brief is submitted pursuant to Rule 29(b) of the Federal Rules 
of Appellate Procedure and Circuit Rule 29-2(a). In accordance with 
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29(b) and Circuit Rule 29-2(a), 
counsel states that counsel for all parties have given consent to the 
filing of this amicus brief. 
As required by Rule 29(a)(4)(E) of the Federal Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, counsel certifies that: no party’s counsel authored this brief 
in whole or in part; no party or party’s counsel contributed money that 
was intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief; and no 
person or entity—other than amici curiae, their members, or their 
counsel—contributed money that was intended to fund the preparation 
or submission of this brief. 
Dated: November 7, 2019   By: /s/ Venkat Balasubramani  
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IDENTITY AND INTERESTS OF AMICI 
 This brief of amici curiae is submitted on behalf of the following 
individuals (affiliations are for identification only): 
Prof. Roger Allan Ford, University of New Hampshire Franklin 
Pierce School of Law 
Prof. Yvette Joy Liebesman, Saint Louis University School of Law 
Prof. Phil Malone, Juelsgaard Intellectual Property and Innovation 
Clinic, Stanford Law School 
Prof. Connie Davis Nichols, Baylor Law 
Riana Pfefferkorn, Center for Internet and Society, Stanford Law 
School  
Prof. Rebecca Tushnet, Harvard Law School 
Prof. Jonathan Weinberg, Wayne State University Law School  
Amici are cybersecurity law professors and scholars who teach 
and write about the threats facing businesses and consumers online and 
how to combat those threats. Amici write to express their concerns 
about how the panel decision will benefit malefactors and undermine 
cybersecurity. Unless the Court corrects the panel decision, the amici 





 The panel or the Court en banc should rehear this case so that it 
can reevaluate the ruling’s consequences for cybersecurity. Though anti-
competitive animus could be a troubling reason for one software 
program to block another, the Court’s decision overcorrects for this 
concern. The panel decision will foster spurious legal accusations of 
anti-competitive blocking of software programs that are, in fact, 
dangerous to businesses and consumers. These legal threats will hinder 
the ability of anti-threat software vendors to properly classify threats to 
businesses and consumers, which will make the Internet less safe for 
everyone. 
II. ARGUMENT 
 Businesses and consumers rely on third-party software to protect 
their computing devices from external threats. We refer to these third-
party software providers as “anti-threat software vendors.” The threats 
they manage include: 




 Software that is not inherently pernicious but nevertheless may 
cause problems for users, sometimes called “Potentially Unwanted 
Programs” or “PUPs.” These programs are also sometimes called 
“crapware” and can include adware and “bloatware.” 
 Unwanted content, such as spam or objectionable content.  
Without robust anti-threat software, businesses and consumers 
would be overrun by threats that would render their computing devices 
unusable and expose them to financial, physical, and other risks. Any 
legal or regulatory scheme that undermines the ability of anti-threat 
software vendors to protect consumers and businesses poses a major 
threat to the Internet’s integrity. See generally Roger Allan Ford, Data 
Scams, 57 HOUSTON L. REV. 111 (2019) (discussing the vital role that 
intermediaries play in combating online threats). 
A. The Importance of Section 230(c)(2)(B)’s Safe Harbor 
 For more than two decades, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(B) (“Section 
230(c)(2)(B)”) has provided a crucial legal foundation for the anti-threat 
software industry. Section 230(c)(2)(B) provides a safe harbor for anti-
threat software vendors that protects their decision to classify software 
and content as “threats.” In Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 
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1169, 1176 (9th Cir. 2009), this Court interpreted Section 230(c)(2)(B) to 
give substantial deference to classification decisions by anti-threat 
software vendors. 
Because of the Zango ruling and the broad applicability of 
Section 230(c)(2)(B), lawsuits over classification decisions have been 
rare in the past decade. As this Court said in Zango, the policy of 
“removing disincentives for the development of software that filters out 
objectionable or inappropriate material[] is served by a safe harbor for 
providers of malware-filtering software.” Zango, 568 F.3d at 1174. The 
Zango ruling has successfully advanced that policy for the past decade. 
 The panel decision upends this legal foundation for the anti-threat 
software industry. It empowers malefactors to challenge an adverse 
classification decision as driven by anti-competitive animus, making 
anti-threat software vendors defend their decisions in court or bend 
their standards to avoid litigation. As anti-threat software vendors 
respond to the chilling effects of threatened litigation, more illegitimate 
software will reach businesses and consumers instead of being blocked. 
Furthermore, the increased costs to document and defend their 
classification decisions will be fatal to some anti-threat software 
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vendors, reducing consumer choice and counterproductively increasing 
the market power—and costs borne by businesses and consumers—of 
the few larger vendors who can survive.  
B. Carving Out Allegations of “Anti-Competitive Animus” 
from Section 230(c)(2)(B) Benefits Rogue Software Vendors 
 
 At first blush, it might seem unusual for an anti-threat software 
vendor to label any rival anti-threat software program as a “threat.” 
Because the vendors are marketplace rivals (at least nominally), 
intuitively any such negative classifications seem like they would be 
due to anti-competitive animus. 
 In reality, there are many legitimate reasons for anti-threat 
software vendors to make negative classifications of rivals. 
 First, well-known and well-regarded anti-threat software 
programs sometimes do not adequately protect businesses and 
consumers. For example, in 2016, Symantec’s well-known Norton Anti-
Virus program had critical security vulnerabilities that left its users 
exposed. Symantec and Norton Security Products Contain Critical 
Vulnerabilities, National Cyber Awareness System Alert (TA16-187A), 
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), July 5, 2016, 
https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA16-187A. Separately, the well-
6 
 
known McAfee “Security Suite” program has been labeled “crapware” 
because it unexpectedly slows down users’ computers. Eric Griffith, 
How to Rid a New PC of Crapware, PCMAG (Feb. 7, 2018), 
https://www.pcmag.com/article/332543/how-to-rid-a-new-pc-of-crapware. 
Although these software programs are from well-established providers, 
they nevertheless may be “PUPs” to businesses and consumers. As a 
result, rival anti-threat software programs might label them as threats 
for legitimate—not anti-competitive—reasons. 
 Second, many programs that claim to be anti-threat software are 
actually the opposite—they create threats for businesses and consumers 
rather than provide protection from threats. There are many colloquial 
labels for anti-threat software programs that themselves pose threats to 
cybersecurity, including “scareware” and “fraudware.” We call these 
programs “rogue software.” 
 Rogue software can expose businesses and consumers to 
significant cybersecurity risks. Rogue software sometimes creates minor 
annoyances, like slowing down a user’s computing device or displaying 
annoying popup ads. Rogue software can fleece consumers by 
demanding money to fix a problem that may not exist at all or that the 
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software program created itself. See generally Brett Stone-Gross et al., 
The Underground Economy of Fake Antivirus Software, June 1, 2011, 
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/7p07k0zr. In the worst cases, rogue 
software can create huge and potentially life-changing problems, like 
exfiltrating highly sensitive confidential data for criminal purposes.  
 There have been substantial litigation efforts to curb the abuses of 
rogue software vendors. Some examples: 
Enforcer Example Enforcements 
Federal Trade 
Commission 
 $163 million judgment against “scareware” 
marketer1 
 $35 million settlement with major retailer 
Office Depot for offering a software program 
that claimed to scan users’ computers for 
viruses and other threats but, in fact, falsely 
reported that their computers had “malware 
symptoms” that could be “fixed” by paying for 
additional services2 
                                                          
1 FTC Case Results in $163 Million Judgment Against “Scareware” 
Marketer, Federal Trade Commission (Oct. 2, 2012), 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2012/10/ftc-case-results-
163-million-judgment-against-scareware-marketer. 
2 Office Depot and Tech Support Firm Will Pay $35 Million to Settle 
FTC Allegations That They Tricked Consumers into Buying Costly 





 $1 million settlement for “marketing software 
that falsely claimed computers were infected 
with spyware, then enticing consumers to pay 
for a program that claimed to remove it”3 
 Defendants promoted their products by 
“misrepresenting that a consumer’s computer 
is at risk [and] installing software without the 
computer user’s consent”4 
Private 
Plaintiffs 
 Class action settlement for software that 
“provided potential customers with a free 
diagnostic scan designed ‘to misrepresent and 
exaggerate the existence and severity of 
                                                          
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2019/03/office-depot-
tech-support-firm-will-pay-35-million-settle-ftc. 
3 Attorney General McKenna Announces $1 Million Settlement In 
Washington’s First Spyware Suit, Washington State Attorney General 
Press Release (Dec. 4, 2006), https://www.atg.wa.gov/news/news-
releases/attorney-general-mckenna-announces-1-million-settlement-
washington-s-first.  
4 Judge Finds Internet Affiliate Advertisers Violated Washington 





detected errors, as well as the overall status 
of the PC’”5 
As these cases suggest, government enforcement and private 
litigation play a critical role in combating rogue software. However, 
those enforcement efforts are insufficient to protect businesses and 
consumers from these threats. Instead, businesses and consumers must 
rely on anti-threat software vendors as their primary defense against 
rogue software. 
The panel decision undermines the ability of anti-threat software 
vendors to perform their vital functions. Rogue software vendors will 
regularly assert unsupportable claims that they are being negatively 
classified because of anti-competitive animus, not because they 
legitimately pose a threat to businesses and consumers. Without 
Section 230(c)(2)(B) to protect their classification decisions, anti-threat 
software vendors will spend more money defending their decisions. Or, 
in the face of challenges to their classification decisions, anti-threat 
software vendors will try to save money by avoiding a courtroom fight 
                                                          
5 Lagarde v. Support.com, Inc., No. C12-0609 JSC, 2013 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 42725, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2013). 
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and revising their classification. Neither outcome benefits businesses 
and consumers, but these outcomes will be the inevitable result of the 
panel decision—which allows rogue software programs to bypass the 
Section 230(c)(2)(B) safe harbor simply by claiming to be a victim of 
anti-competitive animus. Thus, the panel decision conflicts with the 
policy considerations that Section 230(c)(2)(B) was designed to advance. 
III. CONCLUSION 
In Zango, this Court explained that “[r]ecourse to competition is 
consistent with the statute’s express policy of relying on the market for 
the development of interactive computer services.” Zango, 568 F.3d at 
1177. Competition has the best chance of thriving if anti-threat 
software vendors are free to do what they do best, without distortion 
from unfounded claims of anti-competitive animus made by vendors of 
rogue software. 
 The panel decision hampers anti-threat software vendors from 
performing their core functions of protecting consumers and businesses 
online. Because the ruling jeopardizes cybersecurity and makes all of us 




Respectfully submitted and dated: 
November 7, 2019 
By: /s/ Eric Goldman 
  /s/ Venkat Balasubramani 
 
Counsel for Amici Curiae 
12 
 
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 
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certify as follows: 
1. This brief complies with the type-volume limitation because 
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2. This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R. 
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